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1IN SEARCH OF THE TRANSACTION OR OCCURRENCE: COUNTERCLAIMS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Atransaction or occurrence@ is the cornerstone of joinder in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  A counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim is 
compulsory; a counterclaim not arising out of the same transaction or occurrence is permissive.1
A cross-claim must arise out of the transaction or occurrence of the claim or a counterclaim.2 A
third-party defendant may assert a claim against the plaintiff that arises out of the transaction or 
occurrence of the claim; the plaintiff may return the favor.3 An amendment relates back when it 
arises out of the Aconduct, transaction, or occurrence@ of the original pleading.4 Permissive 
joinder of parties is allowed when the right to relief arises out of the same Atransaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.@5
The importance of the Atransaction or occurrence@ extends far beyond the joinder devices. 
 It is close kin to pleading a claim.6 Preclusion doctrines today revolve around the Atransaction.@7
1FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a), (b). 
2FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g). 
3FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a). 
4FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c).  In slightly different fashion, FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d) allows a 
supplemental pleading to set forth Atransactions or occurrences or events@ that happened 
subsequent to the original pleading. 
5FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a). 
6FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 3, topic 2, 
title D, intro. note (1982): 
The term >claim,= or the older cognate term >cause of action,= appears in a variety of 
2The requirement of the Asame case or controversy under Article III@ for supplemental jurisdiction 
is the direct descendantBif not the cloneBof the transaction or occurrence.8
Consequently, the transaction or occurrence is a key concept across civil procedure.  
Exploration of all of the above doctrines will help us understand it, yet together they provide far 
too much material for a single article.  This article is about the one area of joinder that produces 
by far the most difficulty, judged by the volume of reported decisions: compulsory 
counterclaims.  A second, forthcoming article will explore the commonality of transaction or 
occurrence across other joinder devices, pleading, preclusion, and supplemental jurisdiction. 
Part II of this article identifies the historical antecedents for the choice of transaction or 
occurrence as the base of the counterclaim rule.  This part shows how the test fits within the 
 
contexts to refer to a unit of litigation, for example: in stating what a complaint should 
contain . . .. [T]he >transactional= meaning or scope ascribed in this Restatement to claim 
for purposes of res judicata is not singular to that subject; it is a meaning that is being 
progressively ascribed to claim in a number of the contexts in which it appears in a 
modern system of procedure. 
 
See also id. ' 24 cmt.a: AThe present trend is to see claim in factual terms and to make it 
coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of substantive theories . . ..  The 
transaction is the basis of the litigative unit or entity which may not be split.@ See infra notes 34-
41 and accompanying text. 
7RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ' 24(1) (1982): 
When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff=s claim 
pursuant to the rules of merger and bar (see '' 18, 19), the claim extinguished includes 
all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part 
of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. 
828 U.S.C. ' 1367(a) (2000).  The statute brought together the two common law doctrines 
pendent jurisdiction and ancillary jurisdiction.  Pendent jurisdiction depended on a Acommon 
nucleus of operative facts,@ as stated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 
(1966).  Ancillary jurisdiction turned on the same transaction or occurrence.  See 13 CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D ' 3523 (1984 & Supp. 2006). 
3general policies of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which in turn leads to the intended, and 
proper, meaning of the phrase.9
Part III explores the interpretation of transaction or occurrence in compulsory 
counterclaim cases by federal courts.  The courts from the beginning develop four different, 
inconsistent glosses on the rule language.10 Over the years, some decisions properly reflect the 
intention and policies behind the transaction or occurrence.11 Unfortunately, far more decisions 
run contrary to the intention and policies in a variety of ways.12 
Part IV argues for proper interpretation of the transaction or occurrence in compulsory 
counterclaim cases.  This goal is achieved when courts look to the facts of cases instead of to 
legal theories, extraneous policy, or superfluous rule glosses.13 Consequently, Part IV suggests 
that the Atransaction or occurrence@ might profitably be replaced with a test that clearly focuses 
the attention of courts onto those facts; this Part provides more than a dozen suitable alternatives. 
 
9See infra part II. 
10See infra part III.A. 
11See infra part III.B. 
12See infra part III.C. 
13See infra part IV. 
4II. IN SEARCH OF THE TRANSACTION OR OCCURRENCE 
A court or commentator attempting to interpret a legal word or phrase often begins with a 
dictionary definition.  That effort gains little in search of Atransaction or occurrence.@ Long 
before the phrase was baked into the federal joinder rules, the Supreme Court of the United 
States declared A>Transaction= is a word of flexible meaning.  It may comprehend a series of many 
occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their 
logical relationship.@14 Even today, the law dictionary offers little.15 Indeed, many have 
inveighed against the attempt to find a precise definition.16 Accordingly, no precise definition is 
attempted here. 
That does not mean a court should throw up its hands, murmur case-by-case basis, and 
attempt to do rough justice in deciding whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive.  
While Atransaction or occurrence@ may evade precise definition, we know precisely the intent and 
policies behind the phrase.  We look to the intent and policies informing the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure generally, and specifically to the federal joinder rules. 
 
14Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926). 
15The transaction or occurrence test is defined as itself: AA test used to determine whether, 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a), a particular claim is a compulsory counterclaim.@ BLACK=S LAW 
DICTIONARY 535 (8th ed. 2004).  A transaction is defined as AThe act or an instance of conducting 
business or other dealings, esp., the formation, performance, or discharge of a contract,@ or
alternatively, AAny activity involving two or more persons.@ Id. An occurrence is defined as 
ASomething that happens or takes place; specif., an accident, event, or continuing condition that 
results in personal injury or property damage that is neither expected nor intended from the 
standpoint of an insured party.@ Id. at 1109. 
16E.g., Mary Kay Kane, Original Sin and the Transaction in Federal Civil Procedure, 76
TEX. L. REV. 1723, 1724 (1998); Charles A. Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under 
Modern Pleading Rules, 36 MINN. L. REV. 580, 591 (1952). 
5The Federal Rules became effective in 1938, having been authorized by Congress and 
promulgated by the Supreme Court.17 The Federal Rules were drafted by a distinguished 
advisory committee appointed by the Court; the reporter for the committee was Professor, later 
Judge, Charles E. Clark.18 Clark was a procedure expert of long-standing, he held strong views 
about the subject, and he seized the opportunity to embed his procedural philosophy throughout 
the Federal Rules.19 
The global procedural philosophy of Clark is summed up in the title of a speech he later 
published: procedure is the handmaid of justice.20 Rules of procedure should be Acontinually 
restricted to their proper and subordinate role@ to substantive law.21 Clark=s primary theme is 
 
17Congress authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of civil procedure by the 
Rules Enabling Act, Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as 28 
U.S.C. ' 2072 (2000)).  The history of the period from passage of the Rules Enabling Act to the 
effective date of the rules in 1938 is recounted in Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 
1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1043-98 (1982); Stephen N.  Subrin, How Equity Conquered 
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 909, 943-75 (1987). 
18The Supreme Court by order appointed a fourteen-member committee, and designated 
Professor Charles E. Clark of Yale the reporter.  295 U.S. 774-75 (1935). 
19AWith justification, Clark has been called the >prime instigator and architect of the rules 
of federal civil procedure.=@ Subrin, supra note 17, at 961, quoting Fred Rodell, For Charles E. 
Clark: A Brief and Belated but Fond Farewell, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (1965).  See also 
Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of the Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure 
from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 80-81 (1988) (ACharles Clark 
was perhaps the single most important figure in the drafting of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure . . .. Although Clark=s views were not held by all members of the Advisory Committee, 
his influence was considerable.@); Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 915 (1976) (Clark Awas principally responsible for 
the drafting of the Federal Rules.@)
20Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 298 (1938). 
21Id. at 298.  See also CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING '
6procedure should serve substantive law, or in other words, that procedural rules should promote 
decision on the merits of a case.22 By de-emphasizing procedural rulings, the primary peripheral 
benefit is saving time and resources for all.23 
More specifically, Clark=s procedural philosophy is apparent in the joinder rules.24 The 
primary point of all the joinder rulesBincluding the counterclaimBis whenever feasible to settle all 
controversies between the litigants in one suit.25 Settling all controversies in the same suit 
 
12, at 60 (2d ed. 1947) (A[T]he lawsuit is to vindicate rules of substantive law, not rules of 
pleading, and the latter must always yield to the former.@). 
22AOne theme pervades [Clark=s] works: procedural technicality stands in the way of 
reaching the merits, and of applying substantive law.@ Subrin, supra note 17, at 962. 
23AClark implicitly urged two of the cardinal virtues of this concept of procedure: cases 
would be decided on their merits rather than by procedural rulings, and this would occur with an 
economy of time and resources.@ Smith, supra note 19, at 916. 
24Bone, supra note 19, at 81 (AClark, with the help of his research assistant James 
William Moore, took major responsibility for drafting the party structure provisions of the 
Federal Rules.@)
25The leading early commentator on the new rules, Professor Charles A. Wright, opined 
Athe sound policy is to require the pleading of defendant=s claims whenever there is any 
possibility that it may be advantageous to have them tried with plaintiff=s claims.@ Charles A. 
Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim under Modern Pleading, 39 IOWA L. 
REV.255, 275 (1954).  Writing of the MINN. R. CIV. P., which were patterned closely after the 
FED. R. CIV. P., Wright stated AThe purpose, as has been indicated, is to make >one lawsuit grow 
where two grew before.=@ Wright, supra note 16, at 580.  Inveighing against restrictive 
interpretation of Atransaction@ in some code state opinions, Charles E. Clark wrote AAny attempt 
at such classifications gives rise to an ever-increasing number of categories with technical 
demarcations which, in their application, tend to obscure the true function of the counterclaim, 
which, presumably, is to enable litigants to settle in one suit as many controversies as feasible.@
CLARK, supra note 21 ' 102, at 657. 
Like the compulsory counterclaim rule, the goal of the permissive joinder of parties 
ruleBalso centered on the Atransaction or occurrence@B is to prevent multiple lawsuits.  See 7
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3D ' 1652 (2001). 
7incorporates two things.  One, broad joinder promotes judicial economy and Aend[s] the necessity 
for litigating the same issues over and over.@26 Second, and more important for our purposes, it 
means joinder objections are not fine-tuned pleading questions but instead are matters for later 
exercise of broad trial court discretion over trial convenience.27 
In order to accomplish these policies and goals, the drafters of the Federal RulesBthe 
advisory committee members and staff, under the firm direction of ClarkBbased the federal 
joinder rules on the Atransaction,@ a term that traces back into the codes and even through to the 
common law.28 The advisory committee note to Federal Rule 13 states it is an Aexpanded 
version@ of former Federal Equity Rule 30, which centered on the Atransaction.@29 The committee 
 
26Charles A. Wright, Modern Pleading and the Alabama Rules, 9 ALA. L. REV. 179, 197 
(1957). 
27Clark believed that joinder questions primarily involved only Athe orderly and efficient 
conduct of court business,@ as contrasted with matters of substantive law, and so should be 
largely left to trial court discretionBto be exercised at the time of trial.  See Bone, supra note 19, 
at 100.  Bone for himself said AThe federal rule drafters . . . defined party structure primarily in 
terms of trial convenience, not in terms of right, and relied to a large extent on trial judge 
discretion to shape optimal lawsuit structure for each dispute.@ Id. at 80.  This is summed up as 
follows: 
The philosophy is that joinder is not properly a pleading problem, but rather is one of trial 
convenience, which can be judged best only at the time of trial. 
 *   *   * 
I think my final advice to the bar can be put very simply: if there is any reason why 
bringing in another party or another claim might get matters settled faster, or cheaper, or 
more justly, then join them.  Somewhere in the rules there is surely authority for the 
joinder. 
Wright, supra note 16, at 580, 632. 
28CLARK, supra note 21 ' 102, at 659. 
29FED. R. CIV. P. 13 advisory committee=s note: 
Rule 13 is an expanded version of former Equity Rule 30 and much of the philosophy of 
the earlier provision has been preserved.  Under Rule 13 the court has broad discretion to 
allow claims to be joined in order to expedite the resolution of all the controversies 
8note does not specify in what ways the new federal rule expands on the equity rule, but certainly 
one expansion is inflating the operative test from Atransaction@ to Atransaction or occurrence.@ In 
the same fashion, the operative test for party joinder is inflated from Atransaction@ to Atransaction 
or occurrence.@30 This quite apparently is done across the joinder rules to broaden the availability 
of joinder under a unified test, as well as to disapprove some grudging code decisions on the 
scope of a Atransaction.@31 
between the parties in one suit. 
The equity rule read in relevant part: AThe answer must state in short and simple form any 
counterclaim arising out of the transaction which is the subject-matter of the suit, and may . . . set 
out any set-off or counterclaim against the plaintiff . . ..@ The history of the proceedings in the 
advisory committee that resulted in patterning the counterclaim rule on the equity rule are traced 
in detail in Wright, supra note 25, at 281-83. 
The history of counterclaims traces back through the common law and code procedures of 
set off and recoupment, the latter of which was dependent on the matter arising from the same 
transaction.  See, e.g., 6 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D ' 1401; CLARK, supra note 21, ' 100.
30FED. R. CIV. P. 20, while clearly kin, does not derive from the same equity rule as does 
FED. R. CIV. P. 13.  The Atransaction@ of the party joinder rule, according to FED. R. CIV. P. 20 
advisory committee=s note, descends from Aprovisions found in England, California, Illinois, New 
Jersey, and New York.@ E.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT ' 209 (1937) (AAll persons may be joined in 
one action as plaintiffs, in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist . . ..@
The history of party joinder can be found in many sources, e.g. CLARK, supra note 21, ''
56-61; 4 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE=S FEDERAL PRACTICE ' 20App.100 (3d ed. 2005); 
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 25, ' 1651. 
31As to the former, see MOORE, supra note 30, at '' 20.02[1][a], 20App.100 n. 7; Carl C. 
Wheaton, A Study of the Statutes Which Contain the Term ASubject of the Action@ and Which 
Relate to Joinder of Actions and Plaintiffs and to Counterclaims, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 232, 242 
(1933). 
As to the latter, see Wright, supra note 25, at 283 n. 121 (AThus it seems clear that the 
purpose of the Federal Advisory Committee in adding >occurrence= to the joinder of parties rule 
was to prevent the New York construction from being put on the rule by adopting a phrase 
different from that which was critical in New York.@).  At the time the committee drafted the 
Federal Rules, Ader v. Blau, 241 N.Y. 7, 148 N.E. 771 (1925), was a recent, much-criticized 
case.  In that case, a boy was injured by an iron picket fence maintained by one defendant, and 
9If the expansion from Atransaction@ to Atransaction or occurrence@ does not make the 
policy of the federal joinder rules clear enough, then the inclusion of Federal Rule 21 seals the 
deal: 
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action.  Parties may be dropped or 
added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of 
the action and on such terms as are just.  Any claim against a party may be severed and 
proceeded with separately.32 
The language points out to judges that joinder problems are to be dealt with as trial convenience 
problems, not pleading problems.33 
Treating joinder as a trial convenience problem instead of a pleading problem is hand-in-
glove with the federal rules= de-emphasis on pleading in favor of deciding cases on the merits.34 
received negligent medical treatment from a second defendant.  The court refused to allow the 
two defendants to be joined in a single action since the injury and the treatment were said to be 
not part of the same Atransaction.@
32FED. R. CIV. P. 21.  With the hindsight of seven decades of joinder decisions, one can 
recognize that Clark and the advisory committee would have been more perspicacious to write 
the language of this rule into each joinder ruleBas New York had done in its permissive joinder 
rule [N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT ' 209 (1937)]. 
33See CLARK, supra note 21, ' 101, at 645; Bone, supra note 19, at 79-80; supra note 27. 
 Unfortunately, with the direction to treat joinder issues as trial problems instead of pleading 
problems separated and isolated, the courts have largely ignored FED. R. CIV. P. 21, and 
consequently have made what was intended to be easy lifting into hard work.  See infra part III. 
34See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.  A decade prior to drafting the FED. R. 
CIV. P., Clark wrote AOur problems of joinder, of stating a cause, of amendment, should be 
decided with reference to the ease of developing the operative facts in our law trials, and our 
application of legal principles to such facts when developed may be expected to take care of 
itself.@ Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 831 (1924).  See also 
Kane, supra note 16, at 1723; Wright, supra note 26, at 180-81: 
One of the principal hallmarks of modern procedural thinking is that it is wise to leave as 
much as possible to the discretion of the trial judge . . .. The other essential point is that 
the desired goal of just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of controversies is not 
served by decisions on technicalities of pleading, nor is it served if results turn on the 
10 
The federal rules simplify pleading by providing for notice pleading of facts sufficient to state a 
Aclaim for relief.@35 The claim is a brand-new term coined in an attempt to eliminate much of the 
wasteful pre-trial litigation encountered in interpreting the code requirements of pleading 
Aultimate facts@ constituting a Acause of action.@36 
The key to the claim for relief is that it is fact-based and fact-defined.  Under the codes, 
some courts and scholars thought a cause of action was law-based, the intersection of a single 
right and duty, a single legal theory of recovery.37 Clark believed strongly a cause of action was 
fact-based, a set of facts that a lay person would expect to be tried together without regard to 
legal rights or duties; one cause of action could contain several legal theories of recovery.38 This 
 
skills and diligence of counsel, rather than on the merits of the case.  This philosophy 
finds its concrete expression in three great reforms: 
1.  A real and effective merger of the forms of action and of law and equity; 
2.  Simplified pleading, supplemented by a broad system of pre-trial devices for 
getting at the merits; 
3.  Unlimited joinder of claims and parties. 
35FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
36See CLARK, supra note 21, ' 38 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3D ' 1202, at 87 (2004); Douglas D. McFarland, The 
Unconstitutional Stub of ' 1441(c), 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1054, 1061-67 (1993). 
37JOHN N. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES ' 347 (4th ed. 1904) (A[T]he primary right and duty 
and the delict or wrong combined constitute the cause of action in the legal sense of the term, and 
as used in the codes of the several states.@); O.W. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34
YALE L.J. 614, 638 (1925) (cause of action Ais that group of operative facts which, standing 
alone, would show a single right in the plaintiff and a single delict to that right@). 
38Early in the debate, Clark wrote 
The cause of action under the code should be viewed as an aggregate of operative facts 
which give rise to one or more relations of right-duty between two or more persons.  The 
size of such aggregate should be worked out in each case pragmatically with an idea of 
securing convenient and efficient dispatch of trial business. 
Clark, supra note 34, at 837.  Many years later, he reiterated a cause of action was Asuch a group 
11 
debate is of historical interest only.  Clark won the debateBat least for federal courts and rules 
statesBthrough drafting the Federal Rules.  The claim for relief did not exist under the codes, and 
the cause of action does not exist under the rules.39 In federal courts and rules states, the claim or 
relief is fact-based, bounded only by a lay conception of what facts properly and conveniently 
group together: 
 
of facts . . . limited as a lay onlooker would to a single occurrence or affair, without particular 
reference to the resulting legal right or theories.@ CLARK, supra note 21 ' 38, at 130.  Clark 
maintained that scholars such as Pomeroy and McCaskill [see supra note 37] were defining a 
right of action, not a cause of action.  Clark, supra note 34, at 823-24. 
39The term Acause of action@ appears nowhere in the FED. R. CIV. P.  In its place, FED. R. 
CIV. P. 8(a)(2) requires pleading Aa short and plain statement of the claim.@ As an aside, Clark 
may have done better to write specific abolishment of the term cause of action into the Federal 
Rules, as he did with Ademurrer@ in FED. R. CIV. P. 7(c).  The cause of action will not go away.  
See McFarland, supra note 36, at 1067. 
This brings to mind the thought that Clark may have done better in drafting the joinder 
rules to coin a new phrase entirely instead of using a well-known term from the codes, the 
Atransaction.@ See infra part IV.  Of course, the test is Atransaction or occurrence,@ which is a new 
test, yet the new test employs the old word.  The Supreme Court had announced ATransaction is a 
word of flexible meaning@ in Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926).  Many 
courts had tried and failed to define the word, e.g., McArthur v. Moffitt, 143 Wis. 564, 128 N.W. 
445 (1910); Stone v. Case, 34 Okla. 5, 124 P. 960 (1912).  Many courts had rendered 
unfortunate, narrow definitions of transaction, e.g., Ader v. Blau, 241 N.Y. 7, 148 N.E. 771 
(1925) (see note 31, supra); McArthur, supra (count to quiet title to land not same transaction as 
count for trespass to same land).  One does not have to be prescient to foresee that courts 
attempting to interpret a new term will look to precedents interpreting the key word of the new 
test.  As could also be predicted, these precedents start courts on the wrong path to decision.  See 
infra parts III.A, C.  Clark was not unaware of this problematical tendency of courts; he decried 
use of common law decisions in interpreting code counterclaim provisions: 
[U]nder the older code provisions the development of a test of >convenience of trial= has 
been unduly hampered by a tendency to adhere to former practice.  This may be due in 
part to judicial inertia, and in part to the terms in which the counterclaim provisions were 
phrased.  The same termsB>transaction= and >subject matter=Bwere familiar to the common 
law in an analogous and somewhat similar capacity. . . . [T]hey were frequently used in 
delimiting the use of the recoupment . . . and these restrictions have unfortunately been 
continued in many code decisions. 
CLARK, supra note 21 ' 102, at 659.  See infra note 47. 
12 
The variable character of >cause of action= has been pointed out. . . . Because of its illusive 
character, that concept has been entirely omitted from the new rules; but a similar idea is 
conveyed. . . . These rules make the extent of the claim involved depend not upon legal 
rights, but upon the facts, that is, upon a lay view of the past events which have given rise 
to the litigation.  Such lay view of a transaction or occurrence, the subject matter of a 
claim is not a precise concept; its outer limits should depend to a considerable extent 
upon the purpose for which the concept is being immediately used.40 
One quickly recognizes the claim for relief sounds much like a Atransaction or 
occurrence.@41 Thus we cycle back to the keystone of the joinder devices.  The definitions of a 
code cause of action, a rules claim for relief, and a transaction or occurrence are all fact-based, 
not law-based.  And all are part and parcel of Clark=s overall philosophy of subordinating 
procedure to substantive law, promoting trial on the merits, and saving time and resources.42 
40CHARLES E. CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 658-59 (1940) (citations 
omitted). 
41In his treatise on code pleading updated twenty years after promulgation of the Federal 
Rules, Clark maintains 
Considering >cause of action= as referring to that group of operative facts which give 
ground for judicial action, the >foundation of the plaintiff=s claim= may well be defined as 
comprising the more material facts of that group of facts set forth in the complaint.  The 
defendant=s cause of action, as set forth in the counterclaim, must >arise out of= such 
>material facts= . . . in the sense that some or all of such >material facts,= as stated in the 
complaint, are also common to, and form a part of, the operative facts set forth in the 
answer as an independent cause of actionB>counterclaim.= . . .
The choice of common operative facts, however, is expressly limited under the 
transaction clause to only those facts which comprise the >contract= or >transaction= set 
forth in the complaint. . . . The term >transaction= would seem to offer great flexibility. . . . 
Conceivably, >transaction= might include all those facts which a layman would naturally 
associate with, or consider as being a part of, the affair, altercation, or course of dealings 
between the parties. 
CLARK, supra note 21 ' 102, at 654-55. 
42See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.  A fact-based definition of cause of 
action in code statesBor claim in rules statesBwould Apromote the >convenient, economical and 
efficient conduct of court business, the enforcing of rules of substantive law with as little 
obtrusion of procedural rules as possible . . .. More shortly we may state it as Aconvenience of 
13 
A skeptic might well point out what Charles Clark intended may not be what the advisory 
committee intended, and what the advisory committee intended may not be what the Supreme 
Court intended, and what the Supreme Court intended may not be what the rule actually says.  
All true enough.  Yet joinder decisions should reflect the procedural philosophy and policy of the 
Federal Rules, and the Federal Rules transparently reflect the procedural philosophy and policy 
of Charles Clark.43 
trial.@=@ Bone, supra note 19, at 85, quoting Clark, supra note 34, at 820. 
Years later, from the bench, Clark warned against narrow definitions across the field of 
civil procedure.  Plaintiff sued on two theories: patent infringement and unfair competition.  The 
majority reasoned that different evidence would be required for each theory and denied pendent 
jurisdiction.  In dissent, Judge Clark fumed 
[T]he core of the plaintiff=s grievance is the same in each case. . . . Narrow views as to it 
may lead not only to peculiar and uneconomical results so far as federal jurisdiction is 
concerned, but also to kindred problems involving res judicata, amendment, finality of 
judgments, and all the other where the yardstick of the cause of action is applicable. 
Musher Found. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1942) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
43The ensuing years brought Charles Clark many opportunities to expound on the 
intended meaning of the FED. R. CIV. P.: he was a federal judge, a frequent public speaker, and a 
member of the advisory committee until his death in 1963.  See Smith, supra note 19, at 915.  
Clark eschewed the desirability of telling everyone what he thought the rules meant: A[I]t is not 
appropriate for me to attempt to state the supposed effect of the various separate rules.  
Interpretation is now, of course, for the courts.@ Clark, supra note 20, at 299.  Despite that 
sentiment, Clark stated his thinking early and often, both in opinions and in speeches.  For 
example, the very article in which he humbly declined to comment on the Federal Rules contains 
many comments.  Id. passim.  See Smith, supra note 19, at 921-50.  Sometimes Clark even 
refused to follow precedents: A>Since I am so publicly committed to advocacy of procedural rules 
both simple and uniform, it is distressing to me, as well as confusing to others who read, to have 
to announce and follow procedural views I oppose . . . .=@ Id. at 951, quoting MARVIN SCHICK,
LEARNED HAND=S COURT 224 n. 8 (1970) (quoting letter to Judge Learned Hand (Feb. 2, 1944)). 
Followers of the Clark philosophy of procedure might wish he had been more willing to 
express his views from the bench.  A prime example is Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d 
Cir. 1944).  Six years after the promulgation of the Federal Rules, the trial court granted a motion 
by an assistant United States Attorney to dismiss a complaint for Afailure to state a cause of 
action.@ The court of appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Clark, mildly reversed.  Clark 
removed a caustic line from the opinion at the request of a fellow judge.  Smith, supra note 19, at 
924.  Had Clark allowed the competitive juices to flow in the Dioguardi opinion, we might have 
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To repeat, that philosophy is when feasible to settle all controversies between the litigants 
in one suit, both to avoid litigating the same issues repeatedly and to promote judicial economy; 
joinder decisions should be convenience of trial decisions, not pleading questions.44 The next 
section of this article evaluates how closely courts follow these policies in their decisions on 
compulsory counterclaims. 
 
III. COURTS STRUGGLE WITH THE TRANSACTION OR OCCURRENCE 
Courts deciding whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, i.e., whether the 
counterclaim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim, typically give lip 
service to the need to interpret the rule liberally or as broadly as possible.45 Many then proceed 
apace to an illiberal, narrow interpretation.46 In doing so, they lose sight of the policies of the 
counterclaim rule, the other joinder rules, and the Federal Rules as a whole.  The Atransaction or 
occurrence,@ which is intended to broaden joinder, is employed in many decisions as a restrictive 
test to deny joinder.  The counterclaim decisions do not return federal procedure to rigid 
formalism of pleadings, but they embark on that road. 
A. Early Identification of Four Glosses for ATransaction or Occurrence@
From the beginning, courts labored to grasp the Atransaction or occurrence@ test.  In their 
search for meaning in the new abstraction, judges quickly created no fewer than four competing 
 
been spared many future opinions with their heads more in the codes than in the rules. 
44See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
45See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 29, ' 1410 n. 1.
46See infra parts III.A, C.  Other courts are more generous.  See infra part III.B. 
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glosses on the rule language, and worse looked for guidance in familiar code practice.47 
The four glosses were summarized in a law review article written only a decade after 
 
47In an earlier era, judges had retreated from the great reform of code practice by 
employing common law notions: 
The cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which the infant Code received from the New 
York judges is matter of history.  They had been bred under the common-law rules of 
pleading and taught to regard that system as the perfection of logic, and they viewed with 
suspicion a system which was heralded as so simple that every man would be able to 
draw his own pleadings.  They proceeded by construction to import in to the Code rules 
and distinctions from the common-law system to such an extent that in a few years they 
had practically so changed it that it could hardly be recognized by its creators. 
McArthur v. Moffett, 143 Wis. 564, ___, 128 N.W. 445, 446 (1910).  See supra note 39. 
So too judges interpreted the new rules with familiar and comfortableBand narrowBcode 
practices.  For example, Judge Charles Clark could not even carry a majority and was forced to 
dissent in two cases narrowly interpreting the scope of plaintiff=s claim for purposes of pendent 
jurisdiction.  Musher Found. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1942); Lewis v. Vendome 
Bags, Inc., 108 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1939).  He dissented strongly from the gloss the majority placed 
on the summary judgment rule in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
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promulgation of the Federal Rules,48 and remain largely intact today: 
Most courts, rather than attempting to define the key terms of Rule 13(a) precisely, have 
preferred to suggest standards by which the compulsory or permissive nature of specific 
counterclaims can be determined.  Four tests have been suggested: 
1) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the 
same? 
2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant=s claim absent the 
compulsory counterclaim rule? 
3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff=s claim as well 
as defendant=s counterclaim? 
4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?49 
48Wright, supra note 25, at 270-71. 
49WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 29, ' 1410, at 52-55.  Other authorities agree 
with this summary.  See BLACK=S, supra note 15, at 1535; MOORE, supra note 30, ' 13.10[1][b]. 
These four Atests,@ or glosses on the rule language, will now be discussed in turn.  Two tests 
(numbers one and three) are inappropriate, one test (number two) passes the buck, and one test 
(number four) is superfluous. 
The first gloss, whether the issues of fact and law are largely the same, is doubly 
inappropriate.  Both sub-tests violate the intent of the rule. 
17 
The lesser error in the first gloss is the idea that the Aissues of fact@ need be Alargely the 
same.@ Certainly facts encompassed within the same transaction or occurrence may produce 
different and discrete fact issues for trial.  A simple example is a contract between A and B.  
When A sues for breach of contract and seeks damages for failure to pay royalties, B 
counterclaims against A for breach of fiduciary duty in passing proprietary information to a third 
person.  One contract, one transaction or occurrence, two dissimilar fact issues.  Another simple 
example is a suit by C against former employer D Corp. for discrimination in firing her; D Corp. 
counterclaims for property damage inflicted by C immediately after the termination.  One firing, 
one transaction or occurrence, two dissimilar fact issues.  Upon first identifying this gloss, 
Professor Charles A. Wright called it Aplainly unsound.@50 Fifty years later, his leading treatise is 
only slightly less critical, deeming the test Aof doubtful utility.@51 
50Wright, supra note 25, at 271. 
51The reasons why the test is Aplainly unsound@ and Aof doubtful utility@ are these: 
It assumes . . . defendant will be both motivated and able to determine before answering 
whether his claim must be asserted as a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a).  Yet, 
given the permissive nature of pleading under the federal rules, no one can be certain 
what the issues are until after the pleadings are closed . . .. Furthermore, a strict 
application of the identity of issues test would be inconsistent with many authoritative 
counterclaim decisions.  Indeed, in the leading Supreme Court decision on compulsory 
counterclaims, Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, which was decided under former 
Equity Rule 30, plaintiff=s claim centered around the question whether defendants were 
violating the antitrust laws by refusing to give plaintiff ticker tape service, while the 
counterclaim raised the issue whether plaintiff was purloining quotations from 
defendant=s exchange and using them for a >bucket shop= operation.  Clearly, neither the 
facts nor the issues involved in these two claims were identical, yet the Supreme Court 
held the counterclaim compulsory, stating: >To hold otherwise would be to rob this branch 
of the rule of all serviceable meaning, since the facts relied upon by the plaintiff rarely, if 
ever, are, in all particulars, the same as those constituting the defendant=s counterclaim.=
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 29, ' 1410, at 58-59, quoting Moore v. New York Cotton 
Exch., 270 U.S 593, 610 (1926). 
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The greater error in the first gloss is the notion that issues of law should be considered at 
all.  The transaction or occurrence was and is fact-based; law is irrelevant.52 Perhaps because 
courts now realize the consideration of legal theories is a false test, recent cases largely abandon 
it.  Some cases, however, still mention legal theories as part of other tests: one leading opinion 
declares AIn short, there is no formalistic test to determine whether suits are logically related.  A 
court should consider the totality of the claims, including the nature of the claims, the legal basis 
for recovery, the law involved, and the respective factual backgrounds.@53 One can only respond 
no.  No!  No!!  No!!!  Well, got one at least. 
The second gloss, whether res judicata would bar a second suit, merely passes the buck.  
The test may have come from a dissenting opinion: A[T]he following is the acid test in 
distinguishing the two: If a defendant fails to set up a >compulsory= counterclaim, he cannot in a 
later suit assert it against the plaintiff, since it is barred by res judicata; but if it is >permissive@,
then it is not thus barred.@54 The statement advances the discussion not a whit.  The court must 
 
52See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.  Referring to the Atransaction@ still 
required in many code states, the primary author of the Federal Rules states 
Many courts have stated restricted definitions, distinguishing as separate things claims 
resting merely upon different legal theories from those sued upon.  The more desirable 
rules seems to be to consider these terms as referring to groupings of operative facts . . .. 
CLARK, supra note 21, ' 102, at 653. 
53Burlington N. R.R. v. Strong, 907 F.2d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 1990).  See infra notes 60-63 
and accompanying text for discussion of the logical relationship test.  Some commentators even 
quote this language from Burlington with apparent approval.  See MOORE, supra note 30 '
13.10[2][a], at 13-18; Michael D. Conway, Comment, Narrowing the Scope of Rule 13(a), 60 U. 
CHI. L. REV.141, 151 (1993). 
54Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Indus. Corp., 154 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1946) 
(Frank, J., dissenting).  Tellingly, Judge Jerome Frank is dissenting from a majority opinion by 
Judge Charles Clark holding a plaintiff=s multiple-theory complaint is only a single claim 
preventing interlocutory appeal under FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
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next ask whether res judicata would bar the claim, and that completes the circle back around to 
whether it arises from the same transaction (or occurrence).  Why take the circular trip? 
Further, the statement is inaccurate.  B=s unpleaded claim against A is not precluded when 
judgment is reached on a claim by A against BBin the absence of a compulsory counterclaim rule. 
 For this reason, Professor Wright first deemed this test not Aapt@ because it would mean the 
compulsory counterclaim rule merely states the law as it always was.55 Fifty years later, his 
treatise points out the test is actually the opposite: absent a compulsory counterclaim rule, a party 
is not barred from suing on an unpleaded counterclaim.56 
A few cases mention the res judicata test, but do not really employ it in the analysis.57 
Like the first test, this second test has largely faded from counterclaim analysis. 
The third gloss, whether substantially the same evidence will support or refute both claim 
and counterclaim, is plainly too narrow.  It is a one-way test.  When the same evidence will 
support or refute both claims, that is a strong indication both arise from the same set of facts.  
 
55See Wright, supra note 25, at 271. 
56WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 29, ' 1410, at 59.  Also, the rule would make 
uniform federal application difficult because preclusion doctrines are state law.  Id. 
57E.g., Iron Mountain Security Storage Corp. v. American Specialty Foods, Inc., 457 F. 
Supp. 1158, 1162  (E.D. Pa. 1978) states ASince . . . the counterclaim arises out of the same set of 
facts . . . it is >compulsory= . . . and would be nonlitigable under res judicata principles if not 
asserted as part of this case.@ That statement asserts only that an unpleaded compulsory 
counterclaim is later barred by res judicata; it does not use res judicata to identify whether the 
counterclaim is compulsory.  Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1975) 
states ARes judicata would not bar Domestic from asserting its counterclaims . . . in a later state 
court suit, because by this Court=s holding them to be permissive, the counterclaims cannot be 
barred.@ In like fashion, that statement asserts only that an unpleaded permissive counterclaim is 
not later barred by res judicata; it does not use res judicata to identify whether the counterclaim is 
permissive. 
20 
The converse is not true: a claim and counterclaim can arise from the same set of factsBthe same 
transaction or occurrenceBand require discrete evidence to prove each.  Professor Wright makes 
this point, with numerous examples, in both his early article and leading modern treatise.58 
Over the years, courts have employed this same-evidence test to reach some spectacularly 
bad results.59 The better course is to abandon it altogether. 
That leaves the fourth gloss, whether the claim and counterclaim are logically related, as 
the best of a bad lot.  At its best, this test focuses on the facts of both the claim and 
counterclaim.60 As such, it is a rather harmless gloss on transaction or occurrence.61 The 
 
58WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 29, ' 1410, at 60; Wright, supra note 25, at 271-
72. 
59Examples abound.  In Ginsberg v. Valhalla Anesthesia Associates, 971 F. Supp. 144 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), when plaintiff became pregnant, she missed some work due to sickness, later 
went on maternity leave, and eventually was terminated.  She claimed for discrimination.  
Defendant counterclaimed 1) for benefits paid her while on maternity leave and 2) for damages 
for poor performance while she was sick.  The court ruled the same-evidence test made the Afirst 
counterclaim@ compulsory but the Asecond counterclaim@ permissive.  The question the court 
should have asked itself is how many times was plaintiff pregnant?  See infra notes 163-72 and 
accompanying text.  Any lay person would expect all the facts of employment issues involved in 
a single pregnancy to be tried together, and a single trial would be efficient for both the court 
system and the parties.  In Anderson v. Central Point School Dist., 554 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ore. 
1982), plaintiff sued on various theories when the school district relieved him of his coaching 
duties.  Defendant district counterclaimed for abuse of process.  The court ruled the counterclaim 
permissive on the same-evidence test.  The question the court should have asked itself is what 
facts did the abuse of process counterclaim arise out of if not the facts of the claim?  In Williams 
v. Robinson, 1 F.R.D. 211 (D.D.C. 1940), plaintiff wife sued for maintenance; defendant 
counterclaimed (Across-complaint@) for divorce against plaintiff on the ground of adultery and 
added Williams as an additional party to the counterclaim.  Williams later sued separately for 
defamation.  The court ruled Williams= claim was not compulsory on the same-evidence test.  
Again, the question the court should have asked itself is what facts the defamation claim arose 
from if not the pleaded adulterous relationship?  See infra note 166.  A lay person would 
certainly expect this sordid set of facts to be tried together, and efficiency considerations support 
that result. 
60See MOORE, supra note 30, ' 13.10[1][a]: under the section heading ALogical 
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criticism sometimes raised against this approach is that it is too flexible, but that is really no 
criticism at all.62 At its worst, this test leads a court to seek the logical relationship in the legal 
theories instead of the facts.  This would be as bad as the first three tests.  Fortunately, the courts 
 
Relationship Rests on Factual Identity of Claims,@ Moore=s treatise states AThe claims are 
logically related if the essential facts alleged by the plaintiff constitute, at least in part, the basis 
of the defendant=s counterclaim.@
61The gloss is obvious when one considers that the proper statement in Moore=s treatise 
should be that the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence Aif the essential facts 
alleged by the plaintiff constitute, at least in part, the basis of the defendant=s counterclaim.@ See 
supra note 60. 
Even Charles Clark apparently was willing to accept the logical relationship test as not far 
from the transaction or occurrence test.  Shortly after the promulgation of the Federal Rules, he 
wrote 
A >compulsory counterclaim= under Rule 13(a) is a claim, not the subject of a pending 
action, which the defendant has at the time of its filing if it >arises out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party=s claim.= This rule is a 
broadening of former Equity Rule 30 to include >occurrence,= as well as >transaction,= and 
to apply to all civil actions, not merely to suits in equity.  But the equity rule had been 
given a liberal interpretation in the interest of avoiding multiplicity of suits in Moore v. 
New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 [1926], where it was said: >@Transaction@= is a 
word of flexible meaning.  It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending 
not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical 
relationship.=
* * *
The compulsory counterclaim device is, of course, only a means of bringing all logically 
related claims into a single litigation. 
Lesnik v. Public Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 975 (2d Cir. 1944).  A decade later, he cited both 
Lesnik and Moore=s treatise in support of the statement AIn practice this [transaction or 
occurrence] criterion has been broadly interpreted to require not an absolute identity of factual 
backgrounds for the two claims, but only a logical relationship between them.@ United Artists 
Corp. v. Masterpiece Productions, Inc., 221 F.2d 213, 216 (2d Cir. 1955). 
62AThe looseness of the latter test has not been a detriment, however, since the courts 
make an effort to apply it in terms of the policies underlying Rule 13(a).@ WRIGHT, MILLER &
KANE, supra note 29, ' 1410, at 65.  Another treatise applauds Athe policies of the compulsory 
counterclaim rule of achieving economy, fairness, and consistency by requiring both to be 
determined in a single suit.@ MOORE, supra note 30, ' 13.10[1][b].  A[T]he sound policy is to 
require the pleading of defendant=s claims whenever there is any possibility that it may be 
advantageous to have them tried with plaintiff=s claim.@ Wright, supra note 25, at 275. 
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have by and large not used the logical relationship test in this manner. 
After fumbling for decades with the four tests just discussed, courts now seem to be 
coalescing around the logical relationship gloss.63 To a limited extent, this is a welcome 
development, but it cannot be greeted with unabashed enthusiasm.  Gloss is gloss.  Even one 
layer of gloss is not enough for some courts.64 And gloss can yield mighty strange results.65 
The courts have made the compulsory counterclaim rule, turning on the transaction or 
occurrence, much harder work than was intended and should be.  A return to both the language of 
 
63A recent opinion identifies five circuitsBSecond, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and District of 
ColumbiaBthat adopt the logical relationship test.  Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. 
Aviation Office of Am., Inc., 292 F.3d 384, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2002) (Alito, J.).  A leading treatise 
counts eight circuits that use one form or another of the logical relationship test.  MOORE, supra 
note 30, '13.10[1][b] counts the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits as using the 
test with weight also given to the same-evidence test; it counts the First, Fifth, and Eleventh 
Circuits as using the test in searching for an Aaggregate of operative facts.@
64See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.  One court complains the logical 
relationship test is too vague and proceeds to hold a counterclaim for defamation arising out of 
the complaint and a press release issued upon the filing of the complaint is only permissive!  
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 600 (D. Mass. 1974).  Another court 
cobbles together various glosses.  Meinrath v. The Singer Co., 87 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980): 
In determining whether the claim and counterclaim arise out of the same >transaction or 
occurrence,= courts in this Circuit are required to assess whether there is a >logical 
relationship@ between the claim and the counterclaim.  Although precise identity of issues 
and evidence between the two claims is not required, their >thrust= must be similar, or the 
counterclaim will be deemed permissive.  In applying this test, the Court may consider 
whether the two claims are >@inextricably intertwined,@= so that a party=s success on one 
renders the other moot; whether separating them would result in >fragmentation of (the) 
litigation and multiplicity of suits= and whether it is fair to preclude a defendant that failed 
to counterclaim from asserting its claim in a separate action in another form. [Footnotes 
omitted.] 
65Holding a counterclaim permissive, one court says AWhile the debt claim and the [Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act] counterclaim raised here may, in a technical sense, arise from the 
same loan transaction, the two claims bear no logical relation to one another.@ Peterson v. United 
Accounts, Inc., 638 F.2d 1134, 1137 (8th Cir. 1981).  See also infra part III.C.2. 
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the rule and the policies behind the rule will result in more sure-footedBand easierBdecisions.66 
B. Some Courts Follow the Rule and Get It Right 
Some early, much celebrated decisions follow the intent and policies of Federal Rule 
13(a) and look to the facts of the cases.  Plaintiff in Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper 
Co.,67 sued defendant in federal court for the state law tort of unfair competition.  Defendant first 
counterclaimed for an antitrust violation, which included allegations of unjustified lawsuits 
against competitors.  Defendant next moved to dismiss the original complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  The court dismissed the complaint on a finding of no diversity, but retained 
the federal question counterclaim.  The original plaintiff then asserted a counterclaimBvirtually 
identical to the original complaintBas a compulsory counterclaim to what was the original 
counterclaim.  The Third Circuit concluded the counterclaim was compulsory and thus under 
ancillary jurisdiction: the two claims were Aoffshoots of the same basic controversy,@ and 
separate trials Awould involve a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the 
courts.@68 The court properly paid no attention to the differing legal theoriesBone federal and one 
state.  The second celebrated case is Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.69 The 
George A. Fuller Company (Fuller) signed two contracts as general contractor with the city of 
Scottsboro, Alabama, to construct a manufacturing plant; the plant was to be leased to Revere 
Copper & Brass Incorporated (Revere).  Aetna Casualty & Ins. Co. (Aetna) issued a performance 
 
66See infra parts III.B, IV. 
67286 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1961). 
68Id. at 634. 
69426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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bond on Fuller.  Plaintiff Revere sued Aetna on the performance bond in federal court.  Aetna 
impleaded Fuller.  Fuller Acounterclaimed@ directly against Revere under Federal Rule 14(a).  
Revere moved to dismiss the 14(a) claim for lack of diversity, but the Fifth Circuit upheld 
ancillary jurisdiction.  Paying no attention to the multiple contracts, the confusing mass of 
parties, and the varying law, the court recognized all the facts arose from a single construction 
project: one transaction or occurrence.70 
These decisions were rendered closer to the time of Charles Clark and may have been 
informed by his influence.  Today, with Clark gone from the scene for more than 40 years, courts 
have by and large moved away from his thinking; the farther removed they become, the more 
they struggle with counterclaim cases, and the more often they conclude a counterclaim is not 
compulsory.71 
Some courts today continue to follow the language and intent of the compulsory 
counterclaim rule.  These are the courts that look to the facts of the claim and counterclaim.72 
70A>The theory adopted in the new rules . . . has been that the >@transaction@= or
>@occurrence@= is the subject matter of a claim, rather than the legal rights arising therefrom; 
additions to or subtractions from the central core of fact do not change this substantial identity . . 
..@ Id. at 713, quoting Clark v. Taylor, 163 F.2d 940, 942 (2d Cir. (1947).  See also LASA Per 
L=Industria Del Marono Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 44 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1969) (despite a 
welter of counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims, court recognized all arose from one 
construction project).  See infra note 162. 
71Early on, the leading commentator wrote ACourts have almost uniformly given 
compulsory rules a liberal construction.  This trend should continue . . ..@ Wright, supra note 25, 
at 299.  This optimistic prediction has not been proved out by later cases.  See infra part III.C. 
72Cf.  MOORE, supra note 30, ' 13.10[1][b], at 13-16-13-17: AThe First, Fifth, and 
Eleventh Circuits ask whether the claim and counterclaim share an >aggregate of operative facts= .
. ..@
Even this approach is somewhat problematical, both because the term Aoperative facts@
has been passed along from code practice, see CLARK, supra note 21, '' 18, 102, and because the 
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phrase is itself a gloss.  Later, the same treatise criticizes the test, saying it Acould have the 
deleterious effect of undermining judicial economy if it allowed the trial in one action of claims 
so loosely related that they do not in fact constitute a convenient trial package.@ Id., ' 13.10[3], 
at 13-26.  Of course, the author has totally lost sight of the purposes of the joinder rules and FED.
R. CIV. P. 21.  See supra notes 27, 32-33 and accompanying text. 
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Many decisions, both older and recent, have focused tightly on the facts to a sound result.73 
73A particularly strong decision is Critical-Vac Filtration Corp. v. Minuteman Intern=l, 
Inc., 233 F.3d 697 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001).  The Second Circuit 
carefully distinguishes a much-criticized and unfortunate Supreme Court precedent [Mercoid 
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944)] to hold that an antitrust counterclaim is 
compulsory to a patent infringement claim arising from the same facts.  The court relies on the 
connection of the essential facts of both claims and the dictates of judicial economy and fairness. 
 Id. at 699.  See also, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Lenoir County Bd. Of Educ., 266 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 
2000) (counterclaim compulsory because arises from same hearing and involves same child and 
school district); Pochiro v. Prudential Ins. Co., 827 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir. 1987) (counterclaim 
Ainextricably intertwined@ with facts of the claim); Nachtman v. Crucible Steel Co., 165 F.2d 
997, 999 (3d Cir. 1948) (Aclaims of the litigants all stem from the basic fact that plaintiff, while 
27 
These courts almost invariably find the counterclaim is compulsory.74 
in defendant=s employ, asserted the right of invention@); D=Jamoos v. Griffith, 368 F. Supp. 2d 
200 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (claim for legal malpractice and counterclaim for attorney fees are based on 
underlying identity of facts); Harrison v. Grass, 304 F. Supp. 2d 710 (D. Md. 2004) (both RICO 
claim and theft counterclaim arise from continuing business relationship); Jupiter Aluminum 
Corp. v. The Home Ins. Co., 181 F.R.D. 605, 608 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (counterclaim arises from 
Asame basic set of facts@ and Ajudicial economy would be served@). 
74Research has found only one decision that may stretch transaction or occurrence too far, 
although the result is to a large extent explained by the fact the appellate court is affirming a trial 
court decision disposing of the entire controversy between the parties.  See United States ex rel. 
D=Agostino Excavators, Inc. v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1970).  The 
prime contractor and the subcontractor entered two contracts for two separate construction jobs.  
The subcontractor sued for nonpayment on one job (which qualified for federal jurisdiction); the 
contractor counterclaimed for overpayments on that job and also the other job (which did not 
qualify for federal jurisdiction).  The court approved the counterclaim covering both jobs as 
compulsory (and thus subject to ancillary jurisdiction) on considerations such as Asame type of 
work,@ Asubstantially the same period,@ Aprogress payments . . . not allocated,@ and Asingle 
insurance policy covered both jobs.@ Id. at 1081-82.  The problem is there were two separate 
jobs. 
C. Many Courts Indulge in Extraneous Considerations and Get It Wrong 
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 Review of the federal counterclaim cases shows that, more often than not, courts look in 
wrong directionsBinstead of to the fact-based transaction or occurrenceBfor guidance in decision. 
 These extraneous considerations often lead courts astray into decisions that a counterclaim is not 
compulsory. 
Why more courts seem to get compulsory counterclaim decisions wrong than those that 
get them right is a matter of speculation, but two ideas come to mind.  The first is AJudges, like 
other mortals, make mistakesBand they do so in matters of procedure more often than 
elsewhere.@75 They often make these mistakes because they do not value procedure as highly as 
substantive law.76 They make these mistakes because of Aprocedural particularism,@ i.e., they 
employ procedural decisions to do justice in the case.77 
This last thought leads into the second idea.  Many judges apparently do not like the 
compulsory counterclaim rule much, so they interpret it narrowly to avoid the results it 
commands.  Enforcement of the rule leads to results judges might deem unfair: an unpleaded 
compulsory counterclaim is lost,78 a compulsory counterclaim forces the court to admit a state 
 
75Wright, supra note 25, at 273. 
76AA real difficulty with our subject is that it is thought beneath the notice of those whose 
gaze is fixed on justice alone, but who nevertheless may stumble without ever seeing the lowly 
obstruction at their feet.@ CLARK, supra note 21, at 71. 
77AThis phenomenon is a result of what may be called >procedural particularism=: >. . . the 
resort to a rule of procedure, often subconsciously created or inflated for the occasion, as a short 
cut to doing justice in a particular case.=@ Wright, supra note 25, at 273 n. 91, quoting CLARK,
supra note 21, at 71. 
78See Burlington N. R.R. v. Strong, 907 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1990) (counterclaim to recover 
insurance benefits paid to employee injured in two incidents not compulsory to employee=s
Federal Employers Liability Act claim for damages for injuries in same incidents). 
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law claim into federal jurisdiction,79 a compulsory counterclaim complicates and makes more 
work in the instant case,80 and a compulsory counterclaim may conflict with other federal 
policies that are perceived more important.81 
This negative attitude among judges toward the compulsory counterclaim rule is 
unfortunate because the rule itself is neutral, and generous application will produce as many 
benefits as detriments to the courts.  An unpleaded compulsory counterclaim is lost, both 
reducing future caseload and providing a strong incentive to avoid piecemeal litigation.82 A
79See Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 2004) (counterclaim to 
collect debts owed under contracts not compulsory to federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act claim 
for racially discriminatory markups on same contracts since Arelated to those purchase contracts, 
but not to any particular clause or rate@); Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Winegardner & Hammons, 
Inc., 714 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1983) (A hotel with two insurance carriers was damaged in a 
hurricane.  When one carrier sued for a declaratory judgment of non-liability, the hotel Across-
complained@ and sought to add the second carrier as an additional defending party.  The court 
said its decision denying the compulsory nature of the counterclaim Ain no way encourages 
piecemeal federal litigation,@ opined a hurricane Acan hardly be called an >operative fact,=@ and 
volunteered that the hotel Ashould sue both insurers in state court.@ Id. at 552, 554.  See infra 
note 164. 
80See Gilldorn Savings Ass=n v. Commerce Savings Ass=n, 804 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(counterclaim concerning exchange of stock for debentures pursuant to terms of stock purchase 
agreement executed a year earlier not compulsory to claim concerning the stock purchase 
agreement; counterclaim Asignificantly more complex@ and Awould have unduly and 
unnecessarily complicated the litigation.@ Id. at 397.) [see infra notes 96-97 and accompanying 
text]; Xerox Corp. v. SCM Corp., 576 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1978) (counterclaim for patent 
infringement not compulsory to claim for antitrust violations; considerations of Aenormous 
burden@ on defendant and delay). 
81See infra part III.C.2. 
82See Wright, supra note 25, at 299: 
Compulsory counterclaim rules may at first blush appear harsh.  On their face they are 
opposed to the dominant trend in procedure today which is to get away from penalizing a 
party=s procedural errors . . .. Yet such rules are an important part of the movement to end 
a multiplicity of litigation, and thus are in the interest of both litigants and the public. 
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broad interpretation of the transaction or occurrence allows a broader scope of the salutary 
doctrine res judicata.83 A compulsory counterclaim relates back and is saved from loss due to 
expiration of the statute of limitations.84 A compulsory counterclaim qualifies for supplemental 
jurisdiction that allows a court to resolve an entire dispute between parties in one lawsuit.85 A
compulsory counterclaim allows a defendant to sue the United States despite the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.86 
1. Courts err in compulsory counterclaim cases 
So many grudging compulsory counterclaim decisions provide so many targets to shoot at 
that one hardly knows whether to use a rifle to start picking off the faulty analyses or to fire a 
shotgun to take out the whole and be done with it.  This section identifies five ways in which the 
courts employ faulty analyses in deciding compulsory counterclaim cases. 
 
83Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is based on a broad definition of transaction.  
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, ' 24.  See supra note 7. 
84See Kirkpatrick v. Lenoir County Bd. Of Educ., 266 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(counterclaim for school district=s payment for educational evaluations of student compulsory to 
claim by parents of child for reimbursement of private school tuition).  See infra note 167. 
8528 U.S.C. ' 1367 (2000).  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
86WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 29, ' 1414.
31 
a. Using gloss on the rule language
An earlier section of this article discussed the four common glosses on Atransaction or 
occurrence@ that were created soon after adoption of the Federal Rules and remain current 
today.87 As there discussed, the first three are worse than mere gloss: they misdirect the court.88 
Only the fourthBwhether a logical relationship exists between the claim and the 
counterclaimBassists the analysis at all.89 The logical relationship test finds better use elsewhere; 
it may be positively helpful in permissive joinder cases,90 but in compulsory counterclaim cases 
 
87See supra part III.A. 
88See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text. 
89See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. 
90The counterclaim rule, FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a),(b), the cross-claim rule, FED. R. CIV. P. 
13(g), and the third-party practice rule, FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a), refer only to Atransaction or 
occurrence.@ The relation back of amendment rule, FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c), employs Aconduct, 
transaction, or occurrence.@ Only the permissive joinder of parties rule, FED. R. CIV.P. 20(a), has 
a broader test: Asame transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.@ While the 
logical relationship test is an unnecessary, unhelpful gloss on Atransaction or occurrence@ [see 
supra notes 64-65], it can be quite helpful to a court stitching together a Aseries of transactions or 
occurrences.@ This analysis will be developed in a forthcoming companion article by the author. 
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it is mere gloss. 
b. Using the wrong test
Some courts and commentators stray further from the rule language than mere gloss to 
outright error.  One leading commentator fastens on the logical relationship test, and then 
proceeds to recognize a Astreamlined construction of the logical relationship test@ that is used by 
several courts; this test, the commentary says 
gives weight to the >same evidence= and >claim preclusion= factors.  It asks the court to 
inspect the totality of the two claims, including the nature of the claims, their legal basis 
for recovery, their respective factual backgrounds, and the underlying substantive law, in 
order to delimit the basic transactional unit encompassing claim and counterclaim.91 
That is just plain wrong in three of its four prongs, as they tell the court to look at the legal 
theories instead of the facts of the case.92 This disturbing triple error likely traces to a decision of 
the Seventh Circuit.93 
c. Misapplication of facts to the test
Other opinions have less trouble with the test than with applying the facts of the 
individual case to it.  The Seventh Circuit has contributed two of these decisions also.  In one, the 
parties entered into companion contracts to sell insurance and to guarantee a loan to finance the 
operation; the question was whether a suit to enforce the guarantee contract was a compulsory 
 
91MOORE, supra note 30, ' 13.10[2][a], at 13-17-13-18. 
92See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
93See Burlington N. R.R. v. Strong, 907 F.2d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 1990).  See supra note 53. 
 Acceptance of this erroneous statement by a leading treatise will almost certainly result in its 
unfortunate spread.  The treatise cites an additional six other decisions of five circuits in support 
of its synthesis, but those opinions offer no support.  See MOORE, supra note 30, ' 13.10[2][a], at 
13-17-13-18. 
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counterclaim in a suit to enforce the sale contract.94 The court recognizes the key consideration 
is whether the claims present a Acore of operative facts,@ and continues to the remarkable 
conclusion AThough as a linguistic matter the claims might arguably have been said to come out 
of the same >transaction=Bthe loan agreement=Bthe relationship between the claims lacked the 
necessary >logical relationship= to make the counterclaim compulsory.@95 In the other case, one 
savings association sold a mortgage operation to another savings association, and a year later 
agreed to exchange a subordinated debenture against the selfsame, now failing, mortgage 
operation into preferred stock.96 The basic question is whether the sale and the exchange are part 
of the same transaction or occurrence for compulsory counterclaim purposes.  After mentioning 
that the Atransaction or occurrence@ should be liberally interpreted, the court proceeds to conclude 
AThe exchange of stock for debentures was totally unrelated to the Stock Purchase Agreement 
originally entered into,@ and adds AThe claims do not spring from a continuous course of dealings 
between the parties . . ..@97 Perhaps the second assertion is more accurate than the first since this 
 
94Colonial Penn Life Ins. Co. v. Hallmark Ins. Administrators, Inc., 31 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
95Id. at 447, 448. 
96Gilldorn Savings Ass=n v. Commerce Savings Ass=n, 804 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1986). 
97Id. at 396, 397. 
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was not a continuous course of dealings; in fact, it is a single business deal. 
Other courts have made similar decisions.  Plaintiffs in one recent case sued an auto 
finance company for racial discrimination in its loan mark up policies, and the finance company 
counterclaimed for the amounts due on the same loans.98 The court finds no logical relationship 
between the facts of the counterclaims and the claims since the counterclaims Arelated to those 
purchase contracts, but not to any particular clause or rate.@99 Another court can perceive no 
Aaggregate of operative facts@ between a claim and cross-claim involving two insurance policies 
covering one hotel damaged in one hurricane.100 A third with little reasoning asserts that the facts 
of a claim for breach of a noncompetition agreement and interference with contract after leaving a 
job Awould do nothing to vitiate@ the facts of a previously-unpleaded counterclaim asserting age 
discrimination and various torts prior to the end of the employment.101 
d. Using all the Atests@
For some courts, using a single gloss on the rule language is not enough.  They work their 
way through all four glosses, or Atests,@ in deciding whether a counterclaim arises from the same 
transaction or occurrence.  Every one of these cases reaches a narrow, grudging conclusion that 
the counterclaim is not compulsory.102 Some decisions are doubtless defective.103 
98Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004). 
99Id. at 209. 
100Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Winegardner & Hammons, Inc., 714 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 
1983).  See infra note 164. 
101Kopf v. Chloride Power Electronics, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (D.N.H. 1995).  See 
infra note 169. 
102Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat=l Bank & Trust Co., 22 F.3d 1472 
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(10th Cir. 1994) (counterclaim involving same debtor-creditor relationship permissive); Federman 
v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1979) (counterclaim for injurious injury 
and fraud permissive as it presents different legal theories from claim for securities fraud); 
Stewart v. Lamar Advertising of Penn LLC, No. Civ. A. 03-2914, 2004 WL 90078 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
14, 2004) (counterclaim for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty during employment not 
compulsory to claim for employment discrimination); Kirkcaldy v. Richmond County Bd. of 
Educ., 212 F.R.D. 289 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (former employee sued former school principal and 
board of education for sexual harassment; cross-claim by principal against board for termination 
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due to harassment allegations not same transaction or occurrence); Goldman Marcus, Inc. v. 
Goldman, No. 99-CIV. 11130 KMW, 2000 WL 297169 (S.D.N.Y. March 21, 2000) 
(counterclaim against former employer for mismanagement and failure to pay salary not 
compulsory to claim by former employer for copyright infringement and appropriation of trade 
secrets); Adamson v. Dataco Derex, Inc., 178 F.R.D. 562 (D. Kan. 1998) (counterclaim for 
misappropriation of trade secrets on job not compulsory to Title VII claim for discrimination on 
job); Majik Market v. Best, 684 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (defendants= counterclaims for 
interference with contract relations and defamation arising from plaintiff=s RICO claim not 
compulsory to that claim); Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69 F.R.D. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1975) 
(counterclaim for debt owed not compulsory to claim for Truth in Lending Act violation arising 
from same debt instrument [see infra part III.C.2]); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 
384 F. Supp. 600 (D. Mass. 1974) (counterclaim for defamation based on complaint and 
accompanying press release not compulsory); Industrial Equip. & Marine Serv., Inc. v. M/V Mr. 
Gus, 333 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (counterclaim for breach of warranties in sale not 
compulsory to claim to enforce mortgage on sale of ship). 
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One opinion does not merely work its way through all four tests.  It employs all four 
considerations as a sort of balancing test.104 
103Federman, 597 F.2d 798; Kirkcaldy, 212 F.R.D. 289; Adamson, 178 F.R.D. 562; Majik 
Market, 684 F. Supp. 1089; Bose Corp., 384 F. Supp. 600; Industrial Equip., 333 F. Supp. 578. 
104Painter v. Harvey, 863 F.2d 329, 331  (4th Cir. 1988): AA court need not answer all 
these questions in the affirmative for the counterclaim to be compulsory.@ In doing so, the court 
makes hard work of a simple case.  Plaintiff sued defendant arresting officer for use of excessive 
force, and defendant counterclaimed for defamation by plaintiff in the filing of the complaint and 
alerting the news media.  The court holds the counterclaim compulsory after working through 
and balancing all four tests.  The sharper analysis would be either to ask what facts the 
defamation counterclaim arose from if not the facts of the complaint, or to consider how many 
times plaintiff was arrested.  See infra note 164. 
e. Using inappropriate considerations
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Courts that fail to focus on the facts and add additions into the analysis seldom 
successfully shape a transaction or occurrence.  Most often these courts inappropriately consider 
the legal theories presented by the claims.105 Sometimes opinions deny that a counterclaim arises 
out of the same transaction or occurrence based at least in part on other extraneous considerations. 
 These include that the counterclaim would require a different appellate path,106 it would place a 
burden on the defending party,107 or it would violate another federal policy.108 The most 
inappropriate of all is that addition of the counterclaim might cause confusion of the jury.109 
105E.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Strong, 907 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1990) (counterclaim for 
recovery of disability benefits paid by employer to employee not compulsory to claim by injured 
employee under Federal Employees= Liability Act for same injury in part because different law 
governs); Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(counterclaim for injurious involvement and fraud permissive as it presents different legal 
theories from claim for securities fraud); Sparrow v. Mazda Am. Credit, 385 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 
(E.D. Cal. 2005) (state law counterclaim for underlying debt not compulsory to federal law claim 
for violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act because Athe legal issues and evidence relating 
to the claims are considered sufficiently distinct,@ and AThe claim and counterclaim are, of 
course, >offshoots= of the same transaction, but they do not represent the same basic controversy 
between the parties.@); Kirkcaldy v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 212 F.R.D. 289, 296 
(M.D.N.C. 2002) (former employee sued former school principal and board of education for 
sexual harassment; cross-claim by principal against board for termination due to harassment 
allegations not same transaction or occurrence as Alegal questions presented . . . would overlap 
very little.@); Shamblin v. City of Colchester, 793 F. Supp. 831, 834 (C.D. Ill. 1992) 
(counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty on job not compulsory to claim for additional wages 
under minimum wage laws because Agoverned by different bodies of law.@); United States v. 
Taylor, 342 F. Supp. 715 (D. Kan. 1972) (counterclaim for wrongful acts of lender in collecting 
note not compulsory to claim for note because claim on a guaranty and counterclaim in tort). 
106See Hydranautics v. Filmtec Corp., 70 F.3d 533 (9th Cir. 1995) (antitrust claim goes to 
court of appeals; patent infringement counterclaim goes to Federal Circuit). 
107Xerox Corp. v. SCM Corp., 576 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1978) (burden and delay to require 
defendant to plead patent infringement counterclaim to antitrust claim). 
108See infra part III.C.2. 
109See Conway, supra note 53, at 161, citing Roberts Metals Inc. v. Florida Properties 
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The response to each and every one of these extraneous, inappropriate considerations is 
the same: the counterclaim rule was drafted specifically to make joinder issues trial questions, not 
pleading questions; the solution of the Federal Rules is later to sever the claims for trial, not to 
deny joinder at the pleading stage.110 
2. Compulsory counterclaims in Truth in Lending Act cases 
One question that has produced a circuit conflict is whether a state-law counterclaim for 
the debt is compulsory to a federal claim for violation of the Truth in Lending Act [TILA].111 In 
the typical case, plaintiff borrower sues the lender in federal court on a claim that the loan 
documents fail to make the disclosures required by the TILA (a federal question); the defendant 
lender counterclaims on the debt (state contract law).  The federal court can hear the counterclaim 
through supplemental jurisdiction only if the counterclaim is compulsory.112 Is a debt 
counterclaim to a TILA claim compulsory?  Several federal courts are in conflict.113 
One line of authority holds the counterclaim is compulsory.  Both the TILA claim and the 
debt counterclaim indisputably arise from the same contract, or debt instrument.  A clearer 
example of the same transaction or occurrence can hardly be found.114 The opposing line of 
 
Mktg. Group, Inc., 138 F.R.D. 89, 91 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Agliam v. Ohio Savings Ass=n, 99
F.R.D. 145, 148 (N.D. Ohio 1983). 
110See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
11115 U.S.C. '' 1601 et seq. (2000). 
11228 U.S.C. ' 1367 (2000).  See supra note 8. 
113See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 29, ' 1410, at 76-78 nn. 64-67 (collecting 
cases). 
114See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. 
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authority holds the counterclaim is permissive.  These courts agree the transaction or occurrence 
encompasses the counterclaim but conclude the federal policy supporting private enforcement of 
the TILA is more compelling.115 
The two competing lines of authority will be developed by analysis of three leading court 
of appeals decisions, all rendered within a year of each other: Whigham v. Beneficial Finance 
Co.,116 Plant v. Blazer Financial Serv., Inc.,117 and Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford.118 Whigham 
finds the counterclaim permissive; Plant finds the counterclaim compulsory; Valencia considers 
both positions and agrees with Whigham.
The one-page Fourth Circuit Whigham opinion holds the counterclaim permissive for 
several reasons: 1) the Aissues of fact and law [are] significantly different,@ 2) Athe evidence 
needed to support each claim differs,@ 3) the two claims Aare not logically related,@ and 4) the 
counterclaim Awould impede expeditious enforcement of the federal penalty and involve the 
district court in debt collection matters having no federal significance.@119 Consider these four 
 
115See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
116599 F.2d 1322 (4th Cir. 1979).  This case also collects earlier precedents.  Id. at 1324. 
117598 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1979). 
118617 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980). 
119599 F.2d at 1324. 
41 
arguments seriatim. 
First, says the court, the issues of fact and law are different.  The primary problem with 
this assertion is the questions of fact in the claim and counterclaim arise from the identical debt 
instrument.  Absolute identity of all facts between any two claims is of course impossible and not 
what is required.120 Indeed, the Whigham court is really not concerned with issues of fact; instead, 
it is concerned with issues of law: AThe lender=s counterclaim, on the other hand, required the 
court to determine the contractual rights of the parties in accordance with state law.@121 The 
response to that statement is the transaction or occurrence is about facts; law is irrelevant.122 
Second, says the court, the evidence to support the claim and counterclaim differs.  That 
too is an extraneous consideration.  The transaction or occurrence is about facts, not evidence.123 
Third, says the court, the two claims are not logically related.  This may arguably be a 
proper consideration, but the conclusion in Whigham is a bald assertion, supported only by the 
illogical statement AThe borrower=s federal claim involves the same loan, but it does not arise 
 
120See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
121599 F.2d at 1324. 
122See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
123See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
42 
from the obligations created by the contractual transaction.@124 If not from the loan document, 
from where then does the TILA claim arise?  From federal law, says the court.  And so the court is 
back to the irrelevant consideration of law. 
 
124599 F.2d at 1324. 
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Fourth, says the court, to allow the counterclaim would impede Aenforcement of the 
federal penalty and involve the district courts in debt collection matters having no federal 
significance.@125 The distaste for having to rule on state law is apparent, yet that is part of the 
work of a federal court under supplementalBat that time ancillaryBjurisdiction.  The key 
consideration of Whigham appears to be that federal policy will suffer from allowing the 
counterclaim.  That too is an irrelevant consideration.  The proper response of a court to that 
concern should be severance for trial.126 
In contrast to Whigham, the Fifth Circuit in Plant holds the debt counterclaim is 
compulsory because Athe obvious interrelationship of the claims and rights of the parties, coupled 
with the common factual bases of the claims, demonstrates a logical relationship.@127 The court 
recognizes the policy argument that allowing the counterclaim might undermine the enforcement 
scheme of the federal TILA,128 but counters that with a more directly relevant policy: the policy of 
the compulsory counterclaim rule to provide complete relief to a defendant brought involuntarily 
into court.129 
125Id. [emphasis added]. 
126See supra notes 27, 32-33 and accompanying text; infra notes 137-45 and 
accompanying text. 
127598 F.2d at 1364. 
128Id. at 1361.  The court also mentions other policy arguments that have been raised 
against a finding the debt counterclaim is compulsory.   A flood of debt counterclaims may 
result; TILA class actions might be destroyed by vast numbers of individual questions; the debt 
claim has a jury trial right while TILA does not; and federal courts would infringe state court 
authority over state law.  Id. at 1362.  Plant does not respond to these arguments directly, perhaps 
considering them mostly make-weight. 
129Id. at 1364.  The court also raises another competing policy.  It points to the concurrent 
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This reasoning is difficult to criticize.  One could quibble with the court=s reference to the 
Aclaims and rights@ of the parties and to the logical relationship test, instead of strict focus on the 
facts and the transaction or occurrence standard, but that would not change the result.  A critic can 
complain the court=s reading of the rule is Aliteral@ or Awooden,@130 but that is the rule.  Any real 
objection must come from the position that the rule should yield to superior federal policy.  Again, 
that is an extraneous consideration.131 
The third case in this little trilogy is Valencia. The Seventh Circuit examines both 
Whigham and Plant, and comes down on the side of Whigham that the debt counterclaim is 
permissive.132 In doing so, the opinion essentially repeats the arguments of Whigham, so the 
responses here will be by interlineation into the analysis section of the Valencia opinion: 
The TILA claim and debt counterclaim raise different legal and factual issues governed by 
different bodies of law. [As stated previously, considerations of differing law are 
irrelevant.]133 A TILA suit for inadequate disclosure, such as the instant case, can often 
 
jurisdiction in federal and state courts created by Congress for TILA enforcement actions.  From 
this, it says that to allow the debtor to pursue the TILA claim in federal court without being 
subject to the debt claim would upset the Aevenhanded treatment afforded both parties under the 
Act,@ and the the TILA Areflects a purpose that the debt claim and the truth-in-lending claims be 
handled together.@ Id. 
130One commentator recognizes a Aliteral application of Rule 13" presents Alittle 
difficulty@ since the same credit transaction is a single transaction or occurrence, yet asserts that 
the proper reading of the rule should not be Awooden.@ F. Gifford Landen, Comment, Truth in 
Lending ActBDefendant=s Debt CounterclaimBCompulsory or Permissive?, 28 CASE W.R.L. REV.
434, 438, 449 (1978).  This commentator argues courts should not be Aconfused or diverted by 
the transaction or occurrence language,@ and should find the counterclaim permissive so as not to 
undermine the enforcement scheme of the TILA.  Id. at 443. 
131See supra notes 27, 32-33, 126 and accompanying text; infra notes 137-45 and 
accompanying text. 
132617 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980). 
133See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
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be resolved by an examination of the face of the loan document.  A debt counterclaim, on 
the other hand, can raise the full range of state law contract issues. [Distaste for state law 
rulings is irrelevant.  The policy of federal joinder is economy and efficiency for the court 
system, not for one court in one case.]134 The two claims do not, as the Fifth Circuit held, 
spring from the same >aggregate of operative facts.= Plant, supra, 598 F.2d at 1361. [Why 
not?] The rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the two claims hinge on 
different facts [Again, why?  The same contract gives rise to both.] and different legal 
principles. [Again, irrelevant.] We concur in the Fourth Circuit=s characterization of the 
relationship between the claims: 
. . . The borrower=s federal claim involves the same loan, but it does not arise from 
the obligations created by the contractual transaction. (citation omitted) [The court 
seems to be saying the debt arises from the loan document and the TILA claim 
arises from the federal statute, but where does the statutory violation arise except 
from the loan document?] 
* * *
Similarly, we concur in the Fourth Circuit=s observation that permitting a creditor to >use 
the federal proceedings as an opportunity to pursue private claims against the borrower 
would impede expeditious enforcement of the federal policy . . ..=135 [Finally, what 
appears to be the real nub of the decision, yet competing policy is extraneous.]136 
Because the policy argument is paramount, this article now examines it.  All agree the 
transaction or occurrence standard of Federal Rule 13(a) results in the conclusion that the debt 
counterclaim is compulsory.  On the other hand, some courts find the rule language outweighed by 
a strong federal policy favoring private enforcement of the TILA; they further find this policy will 
be undermined by subjecting the TILA plaintiff to the debt counterclaim in federal court, 
especially because the debt counterclaim may exceed the claim for the TILA penalty.137 
This policy argument is an excellent example of Aprocedural particularism,@ i.e., Athe resort 
 
134See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 
135617 F.2d at 1291-92. 
136See infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text. 
137E.g., Valencia, 617 F.2d 1278; Whigham, 599 F.2d 1322. Additional cases are 
collected in WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 29, ' 1410, at 76 n. 64. 
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to a rule of procedure, often subconsciously created or inflated for the occasion, as a short cut to 
doing justice in a particular case.@138 Some federal judges seem to believe a TILA plaintiff should 
be able to pursue the statutory penalty unimpeded, and seize on a narrow interpretation of 
transaction or occurrence as the means to reach their favored result. 
The primary reason this is misguided procedural particularism is that the TILA itself 
undercuts the policy argument.  Congress did not provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction and 
enforcement.  Congress provided concurrent jurisdiction with the states.139 A plaintiff who sues 
in state court is without question subject to the debt counterclaim in every stateBeven those that 
provide only for permissive counterclaims.  Congress obviously did not believe its enforcement 
scheme would be undermined in state court enforcement actions.  So why would Congress have 
believed its enforcement scheme would be undermined in federal courts by allowing a debt 
counterclaim?  Even more anomalous would be a TILA case brought in state court and removed 
to federal court.  The result that follows is upon removal, and not before, the federal enforcement 
scheme is undermined by allowing the debt counterclaim. 
 
138CLARK, supra note 21, ' 12, at 71.  See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
13915 U.S.C. ' 1640(e) (2000).  Additionally, contrary to the assertion that private 
enforcement is vital, the TILA actually makes private enforcement an adjunct to enforcement by 
the Federal Trade Commission and other agencies.  15 U.S.C. ' 1607 (2000).  Plant, 598 F.2d at 
1364, asserts the TILA Areflects a purpose that the debt claim and the truth-in-lending claim be 
handled together.@
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The secondary reason is that the policy argument is far more generic, and therefore much 
more make-weight, than has been recognized.  If federal enforcement policy of the TILA is 
undermined by allowing a compulsory counterclaim for the debt, then a federal court should 
decline to find a counterclaim compulsory in a host of other situations that come quickly to mind. 
 A private Title VII discrimination action should not be undermined by any state law counterclaim 
arising from the same employment.  A patent infringement claim should not be undermined by 
any state law counterclaim arising from the same business relationship.  A Miller Act claim for 
payment on a federal construction project should not be undermined by any state law counterclaim 
arising from a transactionally-related construction project.140 A claim under the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act should not be undermined by any state law counterclaim to collect the 
debt.141 A federal antitrust claim should not be undermined by any state law counterclaim arising 
 
140The court ruled the counterclaim compulsory in United States ex rel. D=Agostino 
Excavators, Inc. v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1970). 
14115 U.S.C. '' 1692 et seq. (2000).  Cf. Sparrow v. Mazda Am. Credit, 385 F. Supp. 
1063 (E.D. Cal. 2005).  The court holds the counterclaim permissive (not based on policy 
reasons), and then concludes it still can assert supplemental jurisdiction!  See supra note 105.  
See also Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004) (Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act claim).  See supra note 79. 
The reverse situation has also occurred.  In Peterson v. United Accountants, Inc., 638 
F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1981), the creditor sued in state court to collect the debt, and the debtor did 
not counterclaim.  Later, the debtor sued in federal court under the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act.  The court finds the claim is not barred because Athe goals of Rule 13 and the purpose of the 
FDCPA can best be effectuated by holding the counterclaim involved in this case permissive . . 
..@ Id. at 1137.  In footnote, the court identifies the purpose of Rule 13(a) to be Ato prevent a 
multiplicity of actions and a duplication of judicial efforts.@ Id. at 1137 n. 8.  How the court can 
conclude that preventing multiplicity and duplication will be served by holding a counterclaim 
arising out of the same loan permissive so two actions will do the work of one is unfathomable.  
One can only again mutter Aprocedural particularism.@
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from the same business relationship.142 The list could go on through scores of federal policies that 
depend, at least in part, on private enforcement.143 Perhaps it could continue through vast other 
areas of law.144 
The policy argument in TILA cases, just as it would also be in all of these other areas, is 
misplaced: 
All such decisions as these add to the confusion of the lawyer in understanding an 
essentially simple rule.  And they would not be necessary if the courts would remember 
that the counterclaim rule affects only the pleadings; whatever advantages there may be in 
independent actions can be retained through the power of the courts to order separate 
trials, and, if need be, to enter a final judgment on the plaintiff=s claim before proceeding 
to consider the counterclaim.145 
IV. TWO PROPOSALS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS 
We might wish the Federal Rules had completely abandoned the Atransaction@ of the 
codes, as they did with the replacement of Acause of action@ by Aclaim.@146 Perhaps even today the 
effort might be made.  If the effort is to be made, the question is what should be the replacement? 
 
142The court ruled the counterclaim compulsory in Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert 
Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1961).  See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
143Fifty years ago, a leading commentator identified decisions that had Aprohibited 
counterclaims in replevin actions, or in actions under the Informers= Act, or in forcible detainer 
actions [footnotes omitted].@ Wright, supra note 25, at 276.  The commentator also pointed out 
the error of this approach.  See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
144A legal malpractice claim, for example, enforces the public interest in attorney 
competence, conduct, and ethics.  When a client sues for malpractice, the court will not rule a 
counterclaim for unpaid legal fees does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence 
because it would undermine enforcement of the public interest in competence and ethical 
behavior by attorneys.  Cf. D=Jamoos v. Griffith, 368 F. Supp. 2d 200 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
145Wright, supra note 25, at 276-77. 
146See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
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 The replacement must follow the policies of the Federal Rules.  The replacement should 
exemplify the intended simplicity of the Federal Rules.  The replacement should promote 
predictable application.  Most importantly, the replacement must direct the court=s attention to the 
facts of the case and away from legal theories and other considerations. 
The following is a list of possible replacements for Atransaction or occurrence.@ Every one 
meets the required criteria.  All are largely synonymous.  Here is the list, in only a partially 
organized fashion: 
BAgroupings of operative facts,@147 
BAoperative facts,@ or Aidentity of operative facts,@148 
BAthe aggregate of operative facts,@ or Athe central core of fact,@149 
BAfundamental core@ of facts, or Athe core of the plaintiff=s grievance,@150 
BAcommon nucleus of operative facts,@151 
BAessential facts,@152 
BAsame basic set of facts,@153 
147See CLARK, supra note 21, ' 102, at 653. 
148Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1940) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
149Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 713, 713 (5th Cir. 
1970).  The replacements suggested in notes 147-49  might be somewhat objectionable because 
Aoperative facts@ harks back to code pleading and may invite restrictive interpretations. 
150Musher Found., Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1942) (Clark, J., 
concurring). 
151United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 




BAsingle occurrence or affair,@156 
BAsingle network,@ or Aunit of judicial action,@ or Aone affair,@157 
BAoffshoots of the same basic controversy,@158 or 
BApart of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution.@159 
Other formulations are certainly possible.160 
The problem with each of these phrases will be the same as with the transaction or 
 
153Jupiter Aluminum Corp. v. The Home Ins. Co., 181 F.R.D. 605, 608 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
154CLARK, supra note 21, ' 102, at 658.  This test retains much of current law, and adds 
Afact@ to direct decision. 
155Grattan v. Burnett, 710 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1983); Farb v. Federal Kemper Life 
Assur. Co., 213 F.R.D. 264, 267 (D. Md. 2003) (decisions on relation back of amendments under 
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)). 
156CLARK, supra note 21, ' 38, at 130.  While the following language is too long for a 
rule, it shows clearly the intended meaning: Aall those facts which a layman would naturally 
associate with, or consider as being a part of, the affair, altercation, or course of dealings between 
the parties.@ Id. ' 102, at 655. 
157Bone, supra note 19 at 37, 103 n. 349.  The latter two phrases are taken from CLARK,
supra note 21, ' 19, at 143; Clark, supra note 20, at 312. 
158Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 634 (3d Cir. 1961). 
15928 U.S.C. ' 1367(a) (2000).  This definition has the advantage of tying the joinder 
rules tightly to supplemental jurisdiction, but might misdirect the court=s consideration to law in 
addition to facts. 
160A few that come to mind are bundle of facts, fact bunch, fact grouping, single life-
situation, one set of facts, one aggregate of facts, and facts that a lay person would expect to try 
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occurrence.  A court not buying into the generous joinder philosophy of the Federal Rules, seeking 
to avoid dealing with unfavored claims, or wishing to narrow federal supplemental jurisdiction 
will interpret through and around them.  At least the intent of the rule will be clearer and should 




So long as the transaction or occurrence remains the joinder gold standard, courts will find 
steady guidance in looking to the number of life events presented by the facts of the claim and 
counterclaim.  Instead of searching for small, discrete packages of fact, courts should recognize 
the overarching life events that bind the facts together into a single whole.  Courts reach sound 
decisions furthering the policy goals of the joinder devices when they recognize a single 
transaction or occurrence in one contract agreement,161 one construction project,162 one debt,163 
one injury/accident/incident,164 one death,165 one marriage,166 one student,167 and one property.168 
161Claims arising from the same contract are perhaps the clearest of all the examples of 
one transaction or occurrence.  Causes of action arising from the same contract were specifically 
tied together under code practice.  See CLARK, supra note 21, ' 103.
Even two contracts signed together often fit as one accord.  See Transamerica Occidental 
Life Ins. Co. v. Aviation Office of Am., Inc., 292 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2002); Adam v. Jacobs, 950 
F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1991); Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th 
Cir. 1970). 
162See Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat=l Bank, 525 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1975); 
United States ex rel. D=Agostino Excavators, Inc. v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077 (2d 
Cir. 1970); LASA Per L=Industria Del Marono Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 44 F.2d 413 (6th 
Cir. 1969). 
163See United States v. Aquavella, 615 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980); Plant v. Blazer Fin. Serv., 
Inc., 598 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1979) [see supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text]; Scott v. 
Fairbanks Capital Corp, 284 F. Supp. 2d 880 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (relation back of amendment 
case); Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971). 
Courts that lose sight of the one debt tying the facts together err.  See supra part III.C.2 
(discussing decisions under the Truth in Lending Act). 
164See Painter v. Harvey, 863 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1988); Ruta v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 322 F. 
Supp. 2d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (relation back of amendment case); Jupiter Aluminum Corp. v. 
The Home Ins. Co., 181 F.R.D. 605 (N.D. Ill. 1998); American Samec Corp. v. Florian, 9 F.R.D. 
718 (D. Conn. 1949); Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff 
Autonomy and the Court=s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 823
(1989) (with permissive joinder of parties three passengers injured in one taxicab accident can 
sue together against both the driver and the owner); Wright, supra note 16, at 601 (permissive 
joinder of two persons injured in same collision Aclearly proper@). 
Courts that lose sight of the one injury/accident/incident tying the facts together reach 
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Continuing relationships that can often be handled together for judicial economy and disposition 
of all aspects of a dispute between the parties include one employment relationship/job169 and one 
 
poor decisions.  See Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Winegardner & Hammons, Inc., 714 F.2d 548 
(5th Cir. 1983) (hotel damaged in one hurricane) [see supra note 101]; Burlington N. R.R. v. 
Strong, 907 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1990) (recovery of benefits paid for same injuries) [see supra notes 
92-94 and accompanying text]. 
165See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 323 U.S. 574 (1945); Charles E. Clark, The New 
York Court of Appeals and Pleading, 35 YALE L.J. 85, 89 (1925) (Athe death of the child . . . is 
the ground or occasion of the suit@). 
The code case Ader v. Blau, 241 N.Y. 7, 148 N.E. 771 (1925), holding two defendants 
could not be joined in a suit arising out of the death of a child, was harshly criticized; the federal 
joinder rules were written specifically to avoid such a result.  See CLARK, supra note 21, '61, at 
390-92; Clark, supra, at 86. 
166But cf. Williams v. Robinson, 1 F.R.D. 211 (D.D.C. 1940).  In this early decision, 
plaintiff sued for separate maintenance, defendant Across-complained@ for divorce on the grounds 
of adultery between plaintiff and an additional defending party to the counterclaim, and the 
additional defending party later sued separately for defamation from the adultery allegation.  The 
court held the defamation claim not compulsory.  See supra note 59.  Surely such a result would 
not be reached today. 
167See Kirkpatrick v. Lenoir County Bd. Of Ed., 266 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2000). 
168See Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville, 359 Mo. 282, 221 S.W.2d 471 (1949).  But cf. 
Industrial Equip. & Marine Serv., Inc. v. M/V Mr. Gus, 333 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1971) 
(holding counterclaim involving same ship not compulsory). 
169See Pochiro v. Prudential Ins. Co., 827 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir. 1987); Wright, supra note 
16, at 602 (for permissive joinder of parties, Aemployment in one plant by successive owners is 
surely a >series of transactions or occurrences= if, indeed, it is not a single transaction@).  Cf. 
Stewart v. Lamar Advertising of Penn LLC, No. Civ. A. 03-2914, 2004 WL 90078 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
14, 2004) [competing versions of the reasons for termination appear to be exactly the type of case 
that economy dictates should be presented to a single jury]. 
Cases that attempt to divide one job into separate fact bunches struggle.  See Iglesias v. 
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 156 F.3d 237 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 812 (1998); Kirkcaldy v. 
Richmond County Bd. Of Educ., 212 F.R.D. 289 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (cross-claim); Ginsberg v. 
Valhalla Anesthesia Associates, 971 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Adamson v. Dataco Derex, 
Inc., 178 F.R.D. 562 (D. Kan. 1998); Kopf v. Chloride Power Electronics, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 
1183 (D.N.H. 1995); Shamblin v. City of Colchester, 793 F. Supp. 831 (C.D. Ill. 1992). 
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business relationship.170 
A helpful rule of thumb is to ask how many ______ did the parties have between them?  




170See Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Aviation Office of Am., Inc., 292 F.3d 
384 (3d Cir. 2002); Critical-Vac Filtration Corp. v. Minuteman Intern=l, Inc., 233 F.3d 697 (2d 
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001); United States v. Aquavella, 615 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 
1980); Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1961); Nachtman 
v. Crucible Steel Co., 165 F.2d 997 (3d Cir. 1948); D=Jamoos v. Griffith, 368 F. Supp. 2d 200 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005); Harrison v. Grass, 304 F. Supp. 2d 710 (D. Md. 2004). 
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The joinder rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure use the Atransaction or 
occurrence@ as the primary grouping device.171 The rules are written to broaden joinder through 
allowing factually-connected claims and parties to be brought together into a single lawsuit.172 
Counterclaims, as well as other joinder devices, are intended to present problems of trial 
management, not problems of pleading.173 The policies favoring broad joinder were and are 
procedure should serve substantive law, procedural rules should promote trial on the merits, 
joinder rules should permit as many controversies as possible to be settled in a single lawsuit, and 
joinder rules should promote judicial economy and efficiency.174 In order to accomplish all these 
policies, the transaction or occurrence must be defined by the facts of the case.175 
Unfortunately, courts from the beginning place glosses on the language, and inject 
extraneous, often irrelevant, considerations into their analyses.176 They lose sight of the basic idea 
that the transaction or occurrence is a set of facts that a layperson would expect to be tried 
together.177 
171See supra part I. 
172See supra parts I-II.  This article analyzes the transaction or occurrence as it is used in 
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a), (b), which encompass counterclaims.  Cross-claim decisions under FED. R. 
CIV. P. 13(g) are included, but few are reported.  A forthcoming companion article will analyze 
the Atransaction or occurrence@ in other joinder rules and the sibling Atransaction@ employed in 
additional legal doctrines.  See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text. 
173See supra notes 27, 32-33, 126 and accompanying text. 
174See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text. 
175See supra notes 42, 52 and accompanying text. 
176See supra part III. 
177See supra part II. 
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Perhaps the rules should be amended to replace the transaction or occurrence with a phrase 
that unmistakably points analysis toward the facts.178 Until that occurs, the courts should cast 
aside gloss and extraneous considerations in compulsory counterclaim cases and look solely to the 
facts of the case.  That is where they will find the transaction or occurrence. 
 
178See supra part IV. 
